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 Chapter 5 
 Perverse Expertise and the Social Unconscious 
in the Making of Crisis 
 Richard  Peet 
 This chapter stresses the social construction of the knowledge guiding social action. 
I focus on social construction as opposed to the individual’s psychology of knowl-
edge. The individual always has his or her own mentality, but what matters in the 
making of history are the broad social and cultural trends in thought, imagination, 
and comprehension. Further, I discuss social construction as it is meant in the criti-
cal tradition—Marx’s ideology, Gramsci’s hegemony—whereby class forces lead, 
direct, and control the production of knowledge. Knowledge production serves a 
class interest. As Marx and Engels (1845/ 2004 ) put it,
 The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the 
ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class 
which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over 
the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who 
lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more 
than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material 
relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the rul-
ing one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. (p. 64) 
 If the problems that beset capitalism result from the actions of capitalists—if the 
fi nancial crisis that began in 2007 was caused by speculation by fi nance capital-
ists—then, the dominant interpretations will be those of the causal agents. 
 The rush of contemporary events is thus testing the ideas available for under-
standing them. This testing holds for the ideas developed to think through the imme-
diate onslaught of rebellions, crises, and catastrophes. It also holds for the concepts 
needed to guide a more long-term movement into a different kind of society. 
Narrowly economic categories are insuffi cient for thinking about society as a whole. 
At the least, political-economic-cultural ideas are needed. Clearly, one cannot just 
regard a single country to be a  society and must therefore consider geoeconomic or 
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geopolitical notions—or rather, geopolitical-economic concepts—adequate for a 
globalized existence. A new, critical conceptual apparatus is needed. But this criti-
cal conception is prevented by hegemonic control that a combination of perverse 
expertise and mass social unconsciousness exerts over imaginaries. At the juncture 
between modern knowledge and practical action lies expertise. When the mass mind 
loses its capacity to think rationally, the outcome is social unconsciousness. The 
elite practice perverse expertise, and the masses respond unconsciously. This mind-
set moves capitalist society into an era of perpetual crisis. 
 Neoliberalism, Finance Capitalism, and Crisis 
 I offer a proposition worthy, perhaps, of consideration. Several major, powerful 
blocs of countries have changed from societies with economies characterized by 
industrial capitalism to a new kind of society one might call  fi nance capitalism . In 
the United States, the timing of this transformation is clear. Profi ts from manufac-
turing were far larger than profi ts from other corporate sectors until the 1980s, when 
profi ts in FIRE corporations (fi nance, insurance, and real estate) all of a sudden 
grew rapidly. They overtook those in manufacturing in the 1990s and have remained 
greater ever since. Financial corporations are now the dominant economic institu-
tions in capitalist societies that have transitioned from production to the provision 
of services, especially fi nancial services (Peet,  2011 ). 
 This transition results from secular change in the distribution of income. 
Figure  5.1 , derived from U.S. income-tax statistics computed by Emmanuel Saez 
from the University of California, shows that the 1 % of the U.S. population at the 
highest end of the income scale received 15–25 % of total income in the Liberal 
period of U.S. capitalism (1917–1941). For the subsequent 40 years under Keynesian 
capitalism, that group received a fairly steady 10 %, a fi gure that began to rise suddenly 
in the early 1980s, under Neoliberalism, reaching 20–24 % in the 2000s. Economic 
growth since 1980 has almost exclusively produced higher incomes for the already 
rich (Piketty & Saez,  2003 ). At the other end of the class spectrum, real incomes 
have fallen for the poor and have remained steady for just about everyone else. 
Increasing inequality is the central socioeconomic characteristic of fi nance capitalism.
 Finance capitalism exercises power by controlling access to the markets through 
which capital accumulations become investments, directing fl ows of capital (e.g., 
equity purchases, bond sales, and direct investment) to places and users approved by 
the fi nancial analytic structure of the banks, investment fi rms, and bond sellers on 
Wall Street and in the City of London. In terms of expertise, it is the investment 
analyst’s global gaze, representing the confi dence of the market, by which societies 
and economies are ordered, ranked, and adjudicated. Although investor confi dence 
is presented by the business media as a neutral, technical, and necessary factor—in 
everyone’s best long-term interest—it is actually a committed, fi nancial capitalist 
interest based on utterly biased knowledge. An instructive example is the global 
bond market. The interest paid on sovereign bonds is determined by the risk of 
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default, with experts employing formulae stemming from long experience measured 
statistically—apparently scientifi c and necessary. Yet it is actually a few thousand 
experts representing the interests of accumulated capital who tell governments how 
to run their economies. At the very least, they represent undemocratic expertise. 
 At the confl uence of knowledge and action lies expertise, by which is meant 
high-quality, specialized, theoretical, and practical knowledge. The process that 
produces sophisticated, but inimical, knowledge is what I call  perverse expertise . It 
is expertise in that some of the world’s fi nest minds, such as professional econo-
mists, do the intellectual and practical modeling and are well paid and respected for 
doing so. The process is perverse because knowledge is accumulated in order to 
continue augmenting the incomes of already wealthy people, the capitalist class. 
The only valid economic reason for gross distortions in income distribution of the 
kind that characterizes neoliberal, fi nance capitalism is that wealthy people are so 
rich that they cannot possibly spend all the money they receive and are therefore 
forced to save. The resulting vast accumulation of saved incomes becomes the main 
source of investment capital. Properly invested, capital can be used for research and 
innovation that results in more productive or sustainable economies. Badly invested, 
capital can be used for speculation that results in unstable economies. Knowledge 
and expertise make the difference. 
 Accordingly, Neoliberalism is a way of running the economy that produces dra-
matic price rises on the stock exchange, where the rich put their money to make ever 
more of it. But stocks and shares are a relatively safe bet compared to Neoliberalism’s 

































































 Fig. 5.1  Percentage income (including capital gains) going to the three highest income groups, 
United States, 1917–2008. (Source: Designed and drawn by the author. Statistical data from 
Alveredo, Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez ( 2011 )) 
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swollen credit market. Disaster strikes when, as in 1929 and 2007, the amount of 
money going to the 1 % superrich approaches 25 % of total income generated in the 
country, far exceeding requirements for productive investment and  necessitating 
speculation to enhance returns. For the price of high returns is eternal risk. Any 
investment fund that does not generate quick and large returns and that thereby 
avoids extreme gambles suffers disinvestment in highly competitive markets, where 
money changes hands in a computer-aided fl ash. There is thus a competitive com-
pulsion for experts to be ever more daring as they seek to maximize returns that 
temporarily attract investment. Financial managers, who oversee capital accumula-
tions, compete for control over assets by promising these high returns. Those who 
fail to deliver high profi t rates disappear to be replaced by even more aggressive 
investment analysts. Debt, speculation, hazard, and fear are thereby structurally 
endemic to fi nance capitalism in what Walks ( 2010 ) calls “Ponzi Neoliberalism.” 
Fear itself becomes the source of further speculation, as with buying gold or futures. 
Debt and gambling spread from Wall Street into all sectors of society—house prices, 
state lotteries, casinos, numbers games, bingo at the church hall, sweepstakes, and 
Pokemon cards. Everyone gambles, even children. Production, consumption, econ-
omy, culture, and the use of environments are subject to an ever more removed, 
abstract calculus of power in which ability to contribute to short-term fi nancial 
profi t becomes the main concern. The structure of the system compels expertise into 
perversity. The particular thinker, with his or her own psychological structure and 
thinking processes, has little to do with structural compulsions in the relations 
between knowledge and action. 
 The interlocking of these speculations is the source of their intractability. The 
fi nancial crisis that began in 2007 was thus marked by vastly overpriced housing, 
particularly near booming fi nancial centers; competition among fi nancial institu-
tions to offer easy credit that made many people hopelessly indebted; the bundling 
of home mortgages and other debts into tradable paper; exorbitant levels of leverag-
ing; and the use of assets whose value can disappear in an instant to securitize other, 
even chancier investments. It was not just that crisis spread from one area to another. 
It was that crisis in one area (such as the inevitable end to the housing price bubble) 
had exponential effects on the others (investment banks that were overextended into 
high-risk speculation) to the degree that accumulated losses tested the capacity of 
even client states and governance institutions to rescue the situation. In a nutshell, 
inequality is not merely unethical, it is dangerous. The combination of debt and 
speculation, deriving from inequality, produces an inevitable tendency toward 
repeated fi nancial crises. 
 Buying the State 
 Why are the colossal incomes of the already rich not taxed out of existence? How 
can extreme inequality survive in democracies where people are, at least apparently, 
free to vote for anyone they choose? The main thing about so-called free elections 
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is that they are not free. Elections are expensive. Public opinion is made by media 
persuasion. Political images are costly to produce, in part because sharp minds pon-
der every persuasive aspect, ransack each emotion, and raid the collective memory 
to sell candidates for offi ce. Such images are expensive to distribute, especially 
because the image of the politician has to compete with images of other commodi-
ties that taste nice and look even better than the politician. Politicians therefore have 
to raise a great deal of money to run for offi ce when elections are decided almost 
exclusively by image projection in Fordist societies. 
 In 1976 and 1980, the last U.S. elections under Keynesian capitalism, presiden-
tial candidates collectively raised and spent about $1.75 billion per election. As 
Neoliberalism took hold, the cost of elections soared. In the 2008 U.S. presidential 
election, candidates collectively raised ten times more—just under $17.49 billion, 
with the total cost of the election amounting to just over $5.28 billion. In the 2010 
midterm elections, congressional candidates raised $ 1.08 billion—and senatorial 
candidates, $ 742 million—in an election fought almost entirely on the basis of 
attack ads (data from Center for Responsive Politics,  n.d. ). The 2012 presidential 
elections made even these enormous amounts seem like pocket money. In the few 
months of the early presidential campaign up to the end of June 2012, and before 
things really intensifi ed, President Obama spent $400 million, and eventually $1 bil-
lion. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Citizens United vs. FEC ( 2010 ), ruled 
that under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (which deals with the free-
dom of speech) the government could not restrict the size of corporate donations to 
Super Pacs (Political Action Committees) that indirectly support candidates for 
public offi ce by supporting causes that they stand for. A billion dollars is needed to 
run a high-level campaign. 
 Where does one acquire a billion dollars to run a campaign or support a cause? 
Answer: from people who have a billion dollars. About one tenth of 1 % of the U.S. 
adult population (231,000 people) donate over $2000 each to political campaigns, 
and these donations make up 75 % of the total contributions; a mere 26,000 people 
donate 36 % of total contributions (Center for Responsive Politics  n.d. ). In other 
words, a candidate must raise hundreds of millions of dollars from 200,000 rich 
people to be able to run a campaign. Candidates who do not appeal to the rich or 
who are not wealthy themselves never have a chance. They raise a few million dol-
lars at most (independent candidate Ralph Nader raised $4 million in 2008), they 
cannot run television ads, they are not present at media debates, and most of the 
electorate never hears of them. Rich people choose the political candidates who run 
for offi ce. Under fi nance capitalist democracy, the electorate decides which rich 
people’s candidates are elected to offi ce. And the information spread by costly 
advertising? Most messages are attack ads presenting unfavorable information 
about the candidate or cause they oppose. Most of the rest are image ads presenting 
favorable pictures of the candidate they support. The real content, by which I mean 
substantiated and sustained information about a candidate’s positions and policies, 
hardly appears. Images, attack ads, and the like constitute perverse political knowl-
edge produced by perverse expertise. It produces perverse democracy. 
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 Once in offi ce, politicians are kept in line by lobbying. Companies, labor unions, 
and other organizations, in addition to making campaign contributions, spend 
$3.5 billion each year on efforts to infl uence the U.S. Congress and federal agen-
cies. In the period between 1998 and 2010, the insurance, business association, and 
securities sectors spent $33.6 billion on lobbying, whereas labor spent about 
$30 million a year. Some 130 former members of congress are lobbyists, and lob-
bies employ nearly half the politicians and congressional aides who return to the 
private sector. Such money and connections do not spread scientifi c or factual 
knowledge. They project information based on superfi cial, biased knowledge 
thought up to support powerful interests. Lobbyists are yet another example of per-
verse political expertise. 
 Finance Capitalism and Environmental Crisis 
 During the unusually hot summers of 2010, 2011, and 2012, capitalist society fell 
prey to two crises: an economic depression that states or markets could not end and 
a sequence of environmental tragedies brought on by global warming. Did the two 
crises coincide by mere chance? Or did they stem systematically from the same 
structural causes? The answer might seem obvious were it not for media that must 
confuse on causation as they inform on details. Both economic depression and envi-
ronmental catastrophe result from the extreme risks that must be taken by prominent 
actors under fi nance capitalism—meaning that anyone who does not stake every-
thing is eliminated from power. Crises that threaten humanity are structurally 
endemic to fi nance capitalism. 
 Financial and economic crisis lead to periodic recessions, depressions, and 
downturns punctuated by hopelessly optimistic upturns in the  markets , bringing on 
the terrible social outcome of millions of people losing their jobs, homes, and dig-
nity. But the worst is yet to come as the environment strikes back. The hazards 
endemic to fi nance capitalism extend to precarious environmental relations. The 
bearers of capitalist culture become risk-ridden, short-term in memory and anticipa-
tion, and careless about consequences. They live for the moment, without regard for 
the environmental future. Production, consumption, the economy in general, and 
the use of environments are subject to a remote, abstract calculus of power wherein 
the ability to promote short-term fi nancial profi t becomes primary and long-term 
impacts are not so much ignored as glossed over through sophisticated corporate 
advertising, think-tank excuses, and pseudogreen propaganda (“We, too, care about 
the environment”). By generating above-average profi ts, corporate leaders who 
make environmentally perilous decisions—to drill in deep water, for instance—win 
the investor confi dence that enables them to borrow, invest, and expand and allows 
them to pay their upper management well. CEOs who demonstrate an environmen-
tal conscience do not win the market’s confi dence. Environmental risk (mitigated by 
quality public relations to excuse the occasional mistakes) represents the frontier in 
profi t-making and business success. Every time a disaster such as British Petroleum’s 
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2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is cleaned up, excused, and forgotten, the agents 
of the risk business just become more knowledgeable and slicker at its politicocul-
tural operations. As BP was restoring investor confi dence in the summer of 2010, 
the company announced that it was selling its onshore drilling operations to concen-
trate even more on deep-sea drilling. The danger that produces economic catastro-
phe also creates environmental crises. 
 The neoliberal globalization that has deindustrialized the First World and indus-
trialized parts of the Third World—Brazil, South Korea, China, and India—has 
resulted in a spectacular globalization of environmental destruction. Globalization 
of this neoliberal, fi nancial kind means that economic growth rates slow in the dein-
dustrialized center but accelerate rapidly (rates of 8–10 % a year) in some peripheral 
industrializing countries. China’s economy grew 14-fold between 1980 and 2006 to 
the equivalent of a GDP of $4.4 trillion, and India’s economy grew sixfold, to 
$1.2 trillion, with carbon dioxide emissions increasing proportionately. China’s car-
bon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels amounted to 407 million metric 
tons in 1980 and nearly 2.25 billion in 2010; India’s went from 95 million metric 
tons in 1980 to 564 million in 2010 (Boden & Blasing,  2012 ). 
 Much of this production and pollution is connected to consumption in the First 
World. Some 40 % of China’s product is exported, as is 20 % of India’s, and both 
economies have become dramatically more export oriented. These statistics show 
the globalization of an economy still centered on consumption in the high-income 
countries. This fi xation has led to an intensifi cation of pollution’s globalization, as 
evidenced by carbon dioxide emissions. In 2010 global fossil-fuel carbon emissions 
amounted to 9.13 billion metric tons of carbon. In global terms, more than 500 bil-
lion metric tons of carbon have been released into the atmosphere from the burning 
of fossil fuels and cement production since 1750, and half of these emissions have 
happened since the mid-1970s, when it was already known that greenhouse gasses 
caused global warming—perverse environmental knowledge. 
 The point is that environmental pollution is driven by economic necessity under 
capitalism. It is necessary to pollute so that money can be made. Within the existing 
politicoeconomic context, only economic recession can bring about a drastic 
decrease in pollution. Indeed, global carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil 
fuels temporarily declined by 5.9 % from 2008 through 2009. This reduction came 
about because of a 2.5 % fall in global GDP, a decrease of 11.5 % in the manufactur-
ing production index, and a reduction of 40 % in raw steel production. Yet it is politi-
cally impossible for parties or governments to suggest, in effect, that the necessary 
price of ending environmental destruction is a declining economy. The solution is to 
elevate discussion from the national to the international scale. Upward displacement 
in the environmental discourse necessarily takes the form of UN conferences, Earth 
summits, and unenforceable protocols. Economic necessity produces endless politi-
cal evasion of the environmental issue. Yet under Neoliberalism the signifi cance of 
government regulation of development—and development’s relations with the envi-
ronment—is diminishing because of the intensifi cation of neoliberal and mass 
beliefs, including mass beliefs, about government, markets, and policies. Hence, the 
Tea Party movement in the United States is founded on the idea of reducing the size 
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and interventional zeal of government at a time when state intervention through 
environmental regulation is all that exists in the way of collective response to the 
destruction of nature. 
 In brief, environmental knowledge has escalated as environmental destruction 
has intensifi ed. It is a case of perverse knowledge. 
 Social Unconsciousness 
 Were these issues the only ones, the world’s people might still survive to criticize 
the system yet again. The business–state–media power complex, led by fi nance 
capital and driven by the quest for superprofi ts and fantastic incomes, cannot be 
opposed with any degree of success except by social movements arising from an 
informed, enraged, and rational populace. There has to be a critical, rational, activist 
We-for-Us-to-save-the-world. Yet the other, popular side of fi nance capitalism is 
consumptive excess enabled by the cheap commodities that fl ood in from globalized 
production. The priority of social reproduction shifts from socializing people to 
become workers to socializing people to become consumers. A new type of human 
being is emerging, the consumptive person. The culture of overconsumption pro-
duces mass, popular apathy ( I like , rather than  I think ). Overconsumption is a social 
addiction, a radical, selfi sh individualism that I characterize as the social uncon-
scious. It is  unconscious in that conscious awareness is missing, has not been con-
structed, has not been allowed to develop even from the interpretation of everyday 
experience (common sense), and it is  social in that many people share similar char-
acteristics. The culture of overconsumption is not so much a case of deliberately 
producing mass stupidity, although mass advertising comes close to a corporate 
conspiracy. It is more that the trivialization of everyday life produces unconscious-
ness. Utter trivialization gives rise to a new kind of soft, shallow, compliant person-
ality encased in the kind of fat body that results from total absence of 
self-control—35.7 % of American adults are obese, as are 17 % of American chil-
dren ( Adult Obesity Facts ,  2013 ). Reality is a show. Entertainment is all that is. 
Because every commodity must have a body to bear its message and because every 
service is energy-intensive, overconsumption, overproduction, and the concomitant 
overuse of resources create environmental risk for society as a whole. 
 Essentially, the ability to respond in a radical, collective, socially rational way—
to control an activist, interventionist state democratically, for instance—has been 
consumed away in vast segments of the population living in the global centers of 
power. And the leading ideas produced by experts in the service of power are ideo-
logical diversions rather than means of collective rational intervention. 
 My conclusion is that the intersecting economic and environmental crises will 
continue  ad infi nitum because the existing hegemonic knowledge cannot guide 
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